In a stylized model of international trade, a monopolist in the North exports secondhand products to a representative …rm in the South to be reused as intermediate goods, with potential trade gains. The degree of reusability of waste products is a crucial choice variable in the North. This is because with a lack of international vigilance, nonreusable waste can be mixed illegally with the reusable waste. I explore the driving forces for the movement of illegal waste, paying particular attention to the role of local waste regulations, such as the EU's Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment directive. Under mild conditions, it is shown that increased regulation stringency in the North leads its …rm to reduce the degree of reusability of its products. As a result, the ‡ow of non-reusable waste to the South increases, providing another channel for the Pollution Haven Hypothesis.
Introduction
The phenomenon of transboundary shipment of waste is driven by the scarcity of traditional land…ll capacity in industrialized countries, where post-consumption waste has become a major concern. Governments have recently introduced new types of regulations, called extended producer responsibility, which make …rms and producers responsible for waste dis- The current paper analyzes the impact of such regulations 1 when trade of used products is allowed for.
Although there are second-hand good markets in developed countries, the demand for such goods is often low due to technological obsolescence or regulations (like the technical inspections in many European countries that ensure that vehicles in poor conditions must be taken o¤ the road). However, due to the gap in wealth between industrialized and industrializing economies, developing countries have a positive demand for some products that would be de…ned as waste in the North. This is the case of many e-waste, used vehicles 2 and recycled materials [Janischweski et al. 2003, Beukering and Bouman 2001] . In addition, industrial processes which reuse waste are typically quali…ed as labor-intensive. Therefore, there is a natural movement of waste from developed to less developed countries.
Two important sets of regulations govern transboundary movements of waste. The Basel Convention and EU regulations both restrict the shipment of waste and their disposal. So as 1 For more details on the di¤erent instruments see To¤el et al. (2008) . 2 Janischweski et al. (2003) show that countries in East and West Africa import more second-hand vehicles than new ones. These cars have a particularly poor quality and are often more than 15 years old.
to minimize the environmental impact of waste management, the export of hazardous waste, e-waste and used vehicles from OECD to non-OECD countries is prohibited. However, the di¤erence in the treatment and disposal costs remains one of the driving forces for transboundary shipments. Non-OECD countries often have low-cost, albeit environmentally inadequate, facilities. Czarnomski and Webb (2006) give the example of a PC monitor that costs around £ 5 to be recycled in the UK versus traders willing to pay up to £ 3 for a "visibly undamaged" monitor. The export of such e-waste to non-OECD countries often ends up incinerated in open …res, a practice which is unsafe both for the environment and human health [EEA 2009 ].
When combining i) the di¤erence in local waste regulations, ii) the labor intensity of waste reuse industries and iii) the demand-driving forces, developing countries possess all the necessary characteristics to be pollution havens. Because of environmental concerns in the North, stricter environmental regulations are implemented and increase production costs of dirty industries (waste management) at home. The Pollution Haven Hypothesis stipulates that dirty industries will migrate from developed to less developed countries.
In order to minimize the cost of complying with extended producer responsibility programs, …rms may consider legal and illegal 3 shipments of waste. The New York Times reporter Elisabeth Rosenthal (September 27, 2009) There are two used good market characteristics that I refer to as the lack of international vigilance. The …rst one is that second-hand goods appear to be a one-size-…ts-all category for recyclable, remanufacturable and second-hand products. As a result of these institutional ambiguities, international waste regulations are subject to di¤erent interpretations. Hence, authorities and enforcement agencies of the countries misclassify waste as used goods [Fischer et al. 2008] . Such misclassi…cations have been observed for e-waste and used vehicles 4 [Czarnomski et al. 2006 and Janischweski et al. 2003] , and also for used clothes, car tires and other types of waste [Fischer et al. 2008] . Authorities from developing countries can also turn a blind eye to this illegal market. Reluctant to improve monitoring, they prefer to protect the imported waste business and the labor market it generates [Yardley, April 23, 2010] .
The second characteristic quali…ed as the lack of international vigilance is that many used products are traded along with new ones. This situation makes it hard to keep track of them. One way to evaluate the scale of these markets is to compare prices. For instance, the average price of all exported television sets from Europe is 339e whereas the price drops to 28e when exported to Nigeria, Ghana or Egypt (where more than 1 000 used television sets arrive every day) [EEA 2009 ]. For both waste and used goods, the lack of precision in this identi…cation renders market analysis di¢ cult [EEA 2009 ].
The United-States and India, along with other countries, have led discussions during the Doha round. They want the WTO to undertake initiatives in order to regulate the movement of used products. Today, the WTO has only a draft version of proposed legislation, in which it is recommended that the import of used products be banned. As a result, developed countries see the market for their used products reduced. 5 Under proper regulations, there is potential for gains from liberalizing trade in used goods as shown in Clerides (2008) .
One rationale behind extended producer responsibility programs is that, by internalizing the cost of waste disposal, …rms choose a higher level of reusability. The current paper Few authors have studied extended producer responsibility programs. Runkel (2003) studies the in ‡uence of four instruments on product durability and welfare. He also explores di¤erent competitive environments and shows that the application of an extended producer responsibility program under imperfect competition can lead to a welfare reduction. Fleckinger and Glachant (2010) are concerned with the fact that such programs are precisely designed in order for producers to meet their obligations in their own way. They study a duopoly of producers and compare scenarios where producers manage their waste on their own and where they cooperate through a recycling center (called producer responsibility organization). They conclude that such a cooperation could lead to suboptimal outcomes and justi…es government intervention.
The theoretical literature on trade in used products is still very scarce. Bond (1983) develops a model based on di¤erences in factor prices and technologies in order to explain trade in equipment between …rms. He also tests it empirically. The empirical literature on the topic is more common with Frazer (2008) who explains the decline in apparel production in Africa through used-clothing donations, 6 or Clerides (2008) who describes the gains from trade in used vehicles. To the best of my knowledge, the current paper is the …rst research project which integrates movements of illegal and reusable waste into an economic model.
Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 solves for the equilibrium. Section 4 presents e¤ects of a change in the disposal cost in the North as well as the consequences of stricter enforcement in international vigilance. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The problem is set in a basic model of international trade where a representative …rm in a developing country (the South) imports inputs (used products) from the …rm in the developed country (the North).
New …nal goods are produced in quantity x N by a monopolist in the North and they are consumed at home. At the end of the products'lifetime, the …rm is subject to an extended producer responsibility program. In order to comply with the regulation, the …rm creates a recycling center 7 recognized by the government, which manages the collection and the 6 Similar to food aid, used-clothing imports harm local producers. The problem of used good imports as an obstacle for economic development is also largely discussed in Janischweski et al. (2003) . 7 For instance, in France, four recycling centers are recognized today by the government in order to comply with the WEEE directive. Eco-systèmes gathers many stockholders like LG, Moulinex, Philips and Samsung (see www.eco-systemes.com) while the European Recycling Platform was founded by Braun, Electrolux, HP and Sony (see www.erp-recycling.org). The two others are Ecologic (see www.ecologic-france.com) and Recylum (www.recylum.com). The last one treats only used lamps.
In the curent model, the assumption of a monopolist in the North recalls the assumption of Fleckinger and Glachant. They argue that recycling centers bring a risk of collusion and they explore this issue. Producers collude perfectly and choose the quality (related to the q here) that would be selected in the monopolistic case.
disposal of e-waste. The …rm is both client and owner of the recycling center. For simplicity, the recycling center's activities will be merged in the …rm's objective function.
A portion of the used products are classi…ed as reusable and can be exported to the South as an input to their production. The North exports w e used goods at price p w e . The subscript e refers to the export values. The rest must be disposed in an eco-friendly manner, at constant unit cost of disposal d N . The …rm can also increase the fraction of reusable products q at an increasing and convex unit cost c N (q).
The …rm faces decreasing inverse demand for its new products:
where represents the North's market size.
The …rm in the South is a representative …rm of a market in perfect competition. It employs used products as an input where x S …nal goods are sold at exogenous price p S .
The …rm can either apply some transformation processes like cleaning, remanufacturing or repairing; or it can act as an intermediary in shipping, handling and reselling. One used good is necessary for the production of one output. Production costs are divided in three parts. First, they have to acquire used products from the North. They buy a basket (or a container) of these used products that are previously classi…ed as reusable. They pay p w m for each of the w m imported good. The subscript m refers to the import values.
q denotes the proportion of goods x N that are reusable at the end of their lives. The proportion 1 q is non-reusable and, under international regulations, should not be exported to the South. However, the lack of international vigilance causes a fraction 2 (0; 1) of these non-reusable goods to be misclassi…ed. The actual fraction of used goods classi…ed as Since trade with the South passes through the recycling center, the assumption captures also the North's market power vis-à-vis the …rm in the South. reusable is:
As a result, in the basket of imported goods, only a fraction q = q= q can be used as inputs.
q is referred to as the purity of the basket.
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The second part of production costs re ‡ects the sorting and the transformation processes, which decreases with q. The representative …rm has perfect information about the purity of baskets. Once sorted as reusable, goods require di¤erent degrees of intervention -from simple cleaning to change in parts -and the marginal cost increases with x S . These transformation costs take the form: c S (x s ; q) = x 2 s =2q. The South can also adopt an extended producer responsibility program d S which constitutes the third part of total costs. It is assumed that the South has laxer environmental regulations so that their waste disposal cost is lower than in the North: d S d N .
The market structure
The market structure is described by the following two stage game. Local disposal costs, d S and d N , and the state of international (lack of) vigilance, , are given. In the …rst stage, the monopolist …rm in the North produces new goods in quantity x N and selects the level of reusability q. The …rm also selects the level of exports, w e .
The representative …rm in the South is a price taker on the international market. In the second stage, the level of imports as well as the quantity of output, w m and x S , are determined in the South.
Since the …rm in the North is the leader, its decision when selecting the level of exports 8 It is assumed that the monopolist does not sort waste in order to improve purity. Sorting is a labor intensive activity and is hence too costly for the …rm in the North. As a result, purity depends only on the level of reusability q.
incorporates the representative …rm's reaction function.
The equilibrium
The pro…t functions for the …rm in the North and in the South are respectively:
and w e qx N (1)
Equation 1 means that the monopolist cannot export more than the proportion of used goods classi…ed as reusable. It is assumed that the international market is small enough so that equation 1 is not binding in equilibrium. The scenario of a corner solution, when the South imports all goods classi…ed as reusable is not considered here. 9 Equation (2) says that the …rm's output in the South is limited by the amount of reusable inputs qw m .
Using backward induction, the …nal stage is solved …rst. The representative …rm's problem is:
9 It implies that is large enough. Formally,
In equilibrium, the constraint is binding
and the …rst order condition leads to the following reaction demand function for imported goods:
In equilibrium, the international market clears:
The …rst stage in the game is the …rms's problem in the North. Using equations (4) to (6), the monopolist's problem becomes:
The …rst order conditions lead to:
Where equation (7) is the level of exports, (8) is the production of new goods and (9) is the optimality condition for the choice of reusability q. It is assumed that the second order condition for a maximum is satis…ed. 10 Using equations (4) to (8), the price of exports becomes:
The equilibrium in this industry is characterized by equations (3) to (10). For the purpose of the analysis, illegal shipments, which is the non-reusable share of exports, take the form:
(1 q)w 4 Disposal cost and international vigilance
Disposal cost and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis
One of the rationales behind extended producer responsibility is that, by internalizing the cost of waste disposal, …rms choose a higher level of reusability. Let us see what happens, in the presence of a secondary market in developing countries, when the North applies higher disposal costs.
We have:
Proposition 1 For all q, there exists a unique > 0 such that
Note that depends on the initial value of q, determined by the equilibrium prior to the change in policy.
Proof.
We know that c 0 N (q) and @q=@q are positive. Therefore, equation (11) 
One can see that when the South regulates as much as the North, i.e. d N = d S , the level of reusability q increases unambiguously with the strength of local waste regulation d N . However, when the di¤erence in disposal costs is large enough, more stringent waste regulation in the North reduces the choice of reusability and induces an increased amount of illegal shipments. These observations are explicitly formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the e¤ect of an increased disposal cost in the North d N depends on the di¤erence between local disposal costs,
When the extended producer responsibility is similar between the two countries, i.e. when d N d S < , the …rm in the North, which internalizes the South's disposal cost, does not bene…t from a large di¤erence between local and foreign disposal costs.
Therefore, the …rm will increase the level of reusability of its products q and propose baskets with higher purity q. Because exports are potentially higher, the total e¤ects on the amount of illegal shipments, (1 q)w, as well as on the price of exports p w ; are ambiguous.
When the extended producer responsibility is largely di¤erent between the two countries, i.e. when d N d S > , the …rm in the North bene…ts from a large di¤erence between its local disposal cost and the internalized South's cost. The monopolists'strategy will therefore aim at exporting non-reusable goods, cheaper to be disposed of in the South.
The …rm in the North will reduce the reusability of its products q and reduce the purity of exported baskets q. This strategy lowers the price of exports p w and causes an increased demand of used goods. With a higher level of exports and lower purity, illegal shipments
(1 q)w increase unambiguously. If purity were to stay high, the demand in the South would get saturated quickly and the level of exports would remain too low relative to the increasing disposal cost in the North and the possibility to "dump" non-reusable waste in the South.
In the light of Proposition 2, the initial intention of an extended producer responsibility program is respected when the di¤erence in local regulations shows little di¤erence. As the disposal cost increases in the North, the monopolist is more likely to consider illegal shipments instead of improving the level of reusability. This result is in line with the pollution haven hypothesis since the di¤erence in environmental regulation between developed and less-developed countries brings a ‡ow of pollution (waste) towards poor countries.
International vigilance
This section presents what occurs when international vigilance increases. We have:
The second term in equation (12) is always negative. It represents the variation in the marginal revenue of exports due to a variation in the terms of trade. All else equal, as vigilance increases ( decreases), purity increases as well as the marginal revenue of each exported unit. The …rst term represents the variation in the marginal revenue of exports due to a variation in the marginal e¤ect of the level of reusability q. Looking at the optimality condition for the choice of q (equation 9), we know that (p S q)
Proposition 3 There exists > 0:5 such that
The e¤ect of an increase in international vigilance (a reduction in ) on reusability q depends on the initial value of purity q, prior to the change in policy:
When the initial purity is small, i.e. when q < , an increase in international vigilance unambiguously leads to an improvement in the level of reusability.
When the initial purity is large, i.e. q > ; an increase in international vigilance leads to a reduction in the level of reusability.
Proof. Looking at equation (12), we see that
2 . For the speci…c form of q, the left hand side increases asymptotically with the initial value of q 2 (0; 1) (for a given q (q; ), obtained by any combination of q and , the left hand side is constant) and is positive if only if q > 0:5 since
The right hand side is positive and decreasing in q. Therefore, exists and occurs at > 0:5.
When purity is large, equation (13) becomes positive, which means that, with an increase in international vigilance, an increase in the level of reusability has a smaller e¤ect on purity. When purity is large enough, this incites the …rm in the North to reduce the level of reusability.
Most variables of interest in this model depend on purity q, which varies not only with the level of reusability q, but also with international vigilance . A change in international vigilance a¤ects purity directly through @q=@ and indirectly through (@q=@q) (@q=@ ).
When an increase in international vigilance leads to a reduction in reusability, the two e¤ects work in opposite directions.
Proposition 4 The total e¤ect of an increase in international vigilance (a reduction in ) on purity q is positive if only if
The e¤ects on trade and illegal shipments vary according to the following rule:
, purity increases with international vigilance. In this case, the quantity of exports w decreases as well as illegal shipments, (1 q)w.
, purity decreases as international vigilance increases. In this case, the quantity of exports w increases as well as illegal shipments, (1 q)w.
From Propositions 3 and 4, if purity is initially small, then it increases with international vigilance, i.e. q < , @q=@ < 0 < q(1 q)= . If international vigilance keeps increasing, purity raises and eventualy becomes large when q > :
In some contexts, an improvement in international vigilance will have the opposite e¤ect than what was intended from such a regulation. From Proposition 3, we know that this scenario occurs only when purity is initially high, i.e. @q=@ > q(1 q)= > 0 =) q > .
All else equal, improving international vigilance increases purity. The monopolist who wants to keep a lower level of purity will therefore reduce its level of reusability. When purity is already high, the bene…t of reducing purity through q can be larger than the bene…t, through the terms of trade, of keeping it high. In this case, more international vigilance intensi…es illegal shipments.
Conclusion
This paper considers a North-South model where used durable goods in the North are imported by the …rm in the South as an input to production. The lack of international vigilance allows for illegal waste to be mixed with reusable products.
In order to look at the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, special attention is given to large di¤erences in local waste regulation between the two countries. It appears that the current application of extended producer responsibility programs, which makes producers responsible for the cost of waste disposal, opens up the valve to illegal shipments of waste. Conversely, trade with countries applying similar regulations would conserve the initial intention of such programs: more stringent regulations in the North leads to a higher level of reusability.
International vigilance also plays an important role. Better enforcement of international agreements leads to a reduction in illegal shipments of waste and an increase in the level of reusability. However, when the level of reusability is already high, better enforcement makes higher reusability less attractive. In some cases, lowering the level of reusability provides more bene…t than the improvement in the term of trade. The producer using a high level of reusability would therefore present adverse behavior in case of improved international vigilance.
These results partially come from the fact that producers can manage their obligations in their own way. Because the recycling centers are owned by the producers, they have the incentive to export waste illegally in order to reduce the overall cost of waste disposal.
